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"In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between
the roofs, hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and
then darted away again with a curving flight. It was the
Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows."'
S O READS PART OF Orwell's ominous vision of life in
the eighties. Fortunately, we have escaped much of that
vision.2 The same probably cannot be said about Orwell's
forecast concerning aerial surveillance as a law enforce-
ment technique.3
Police in this country have been using aircraft on the
job since 1929.' Today, law enforcement from the sky has
become an important and effective way to perform a vari-
ety of police functions, on both national and local levels.5
I G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY FOUR 6 (1949).
2 English socialism, for instance, has not become totalitarian as Orwell envi-
sioned. Neither has "oligarchic collectivism" triumphed on the global scale por-
trayed in the famous novel. Harrington, Nineteen Eighty-Four Revisited, in ORWELL'S
NINETEEN EIGHT-FoUR TEXT, SOURCES, CRITICIsM 431 (2d ed. 1982).
3 See infra notes 5-12 and accompanying text; see also infra note 196 and accom-
panying text.
4 See Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 145, 146 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Helicopter Surveillance]. The first reported instances
of aerial surveillance involved military observations from hot air balloons during
the Civil War. Porter, Hanover Court House and Gaines' Mill, in BATTLES AND LEAD-
ERS OF THE CIVIL WAR II 321 (1956).
-See L. KIRKPATRICK, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: FOREIGN POLICY AND
DOMESTIC ACITIES 10-11 (1973) (discussing the use of aerial surveillance by
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Modem aerial surveillance techniques go beyond the use
of helicopters and other conventional aircraft.6 The Jus-
tice Department recently revealed that it now uses satel-
lites to photograph illegal crops in certain parts of the
United States. 7 According to one source, the Reagan Ad-
ministration's task force on drug trafficking has become
"the first ... in law enforcement history, using Pentagon,
CIA and NASA satellites to spy on narcotics operations." 8
The use of aerial searches to identify and apprehend
criminal suspects raises serious questions about the con-
stitutionality of such searches under the fourth amend-
ment.9 State and lower federal courts have produced a
mixed bag of responses to the problems arising in this
area.'" Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court
has yet to decide a case challenging the constitutionality
of an aerial search." And in the words of one writer,
federal authorities to monitor domestic, as well as foreign, activities); see also Com-
ment, Helicopter Surveillance, supra note 4, at 146-47 (noting the increased use of
aircraft, especially helicopters, to conduct rescue operations, aid ground units in
high-speed chases, streamline patrol and investigation functions, and provide
highly mobile observation and command posts). A survey of reported aerial sur-
veillance cases shows that airborne searches have been employed in a variety of
contexts. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984)
(upholding the constitutionality of Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] over-
flights of a Dow Chemical plant suspected of violating pollution laws), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985) (No. 84-1259); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d
1323 (1977) (upholding the conviction of a defendant whose marijuana patch was
discovered in an aerial search); People v. Lashmett, 71 111. App. .3d 429, 389
N.E.2d 888 (1979) (reversing the trial court's suppression of evidence obtained by
aerial surveillance which led to discovery of a stolen tractor in defendant's field),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
6 See generally Comment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17J. MAR. L.
REV. 455, 489-91 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Aerial Surveillance].
7 Id. at 490 (citing the Chicago Tribune, Jan. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 5).
8 Id.
The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10 See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R. FED. 772 (1982).
1 The Court did mention the issue in the recent case of Oliver v. United States,
104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984). Oliver, however, did not involve an aerial search,
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"before the Court has even examined an airborn [sic]
search case, technology has allowed the police to use
satellites as a method of surveillance." 1 2
Because the fourth amendment does not preclude all
searches, but only those considered "unreasonable,"'" an
obvious difficulty lies in determining what makes an aerial
search unreasonable.' 4 Without specific guidance from
the Supreme Court, the factors considered by lower
courts in assessing the reasonableness of aerial searches
have varied from case to case. 5 If, as the Supreme Court
recently stated, "a case-by-case approach [does not] pro-
vide a workable accommodation between the needs of law
enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment,"' 6 then the time has come to establish con-
stitutional standards for aerial surveillance.17
Part I of this comment discusses the fourth amendment
right to privacy generally before focusing more narrowly
on its application to aerial surveillance. Part II examines
the aerial surveillance cases decided by the lower federal
and the Court did not elaborate on the question. For a complete discussion of
Oliver, see infra notes 107-130 and accompanying text.
Shortly before this paper went to press, the United States Supreme Court heard
arguments in two consolidated aerial surveillance cases, California v. Ciraolo, 161
Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985)
(No. 84-1513, argued Dec. 10, 1985); and Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749
F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985) (No. 84-1259, argued
Dec. 10, 1985). While the Court may hand down an opinion on these cases by the
time this comment appears in print, it seems likely that the myriad of questions
presented in various airborne search scenarios will require more than a single
opinion for resolution. See infra note 240 for a discussion of the lower court opin-
ion in Ciraolo. See infra notes 169-181 for a complete discussion of the lower court
decisions in Dow.
12 Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 489. But see supra note 11.
is Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979).
14 See generally Note, Aerial Surveillance: Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, 50 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 271, 273-90 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Overlooking the Fourth
Amendment].
15 See infra notes 131-222 and accompanying text.
16 Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
17 While other observers have suggested approaches for determining the rea-
sonableness of an aerial search, see, e.g., Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 14, at 280-90, and Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 482-89,
this comment proposes an analysis differing to some extent from previously sug-
gested tests. See infra notes 223-313 and accompanying text.
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courts, and identifies some factors these courts have re-
lied on to arrive at a decision. Finally, Part III offers a
critical analysis of the recurring factors considered in ae-
rial search cases.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE CONTEXT
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion safeguards "[t]he right of the people to be secure...
against unreasonable searches.""' The amendment
grants no new right, but instead secures a fundamental
right to privacy that existed long before the Constitu-
tion.19 That right is not absolute, but protects the individ-
ual only against unwarranted governmental intrusion.2 °
By incorporation through the fourteenth amendment,2 '
the fourth amendment applies to the states as well as the
federal government. 22  Generally, evidence produced by
an unlawful search must be excluded at trial if the state
decides to prosecute. 23 In some instances, civil remedies
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For the full text of the amendment, see supra note 9.
The fourth amendment took effect in 1790. F. THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, II, 261 (1901). The amendment finds its roots in
free speech, politics, and other activities which provide a conducive atmosphere
for governmental intrusion. SeeJ. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1:1 1 (1982). For
a detailed discussion of the amendment's origins and early history, see J. LANDYN-
SKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-48 (1966).
"I United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701 (S.C. Cir. 1871) (No. 14,893).
20 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54. See generally LANDYNSKI, supra note 18, at 87-117.
21 U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant
part that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." Id.
22 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). Prior to the fourteenth amend-
ment's adoption in 1868, the fourth amendment (along with the rest of the Bill of
Rights) applied to the federal government only. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1, 9-10 (1978).
23 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316 (1921). An exception to this exclu-
sionary rule may be found if the official conducting the search acts in good faith
reliance on a defective warrant. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
This "good faith" exception may not apply to the states. Most states have their
own constitutional provision safeguarding the same privacy rights protected by
the fourth amendment. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9. Any requirement that
states must apply Leon's "good faith" exception to their own constitutional provi-
sions remains debatable. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (sug-
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also may be available to a citizen whose fourth amend-
ment rights suffer encroachment. 4
The fourth amendment does not lend itself to Procrus-
tean application.2 5 Instead, it requires a balancing be-
tween an individual's right to privacy and society's
interest in law enforcement.26 Nonetheless, the United
States Supreme Court has established certain standards
for application of the fourth amendment in recurring fac-
tual paradigms.2 7 The absence of such standards in aerial
search situations provides the focus for the remainder of
this comment.28
A. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
The fourth amendment proscribes only unreasonable
searches and seizures, implying that authorities can con-
duct reasonable searches and seizures without violating
the fourth amendment. 29 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the fourth amendment in this fashion, taking the
position that "what the Constitution forbids is not all
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and
seizures."' 0 Despite general agreement on this aspect,
gesting that a state may impose higher standards on searches and seizures than
the standards imposed by the Federal Constitution).
24 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics civilly
liable for warrantless entry of the petitioner's apartment, since the intrusion
clearly violated his fourth amendment right to privacy).
25 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (noting that "the Fourth Amend-
ment is not capable of ... mechanical application," and upholding visual body-
cavity searches of prison inmates).
26 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27 See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (holding that the purely random stop of an
automobile by a police officer constituted an unreasonable seizure); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71 (1971) (holding that evidence in plain view
can be seized without a warrant only when the plain view arises inadvertently and
follows a prior valid intrusion).
28 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
29 Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 461 n.31. See generally 68 AM.
JUR. 2D Search and Seizure § 2 (1973).
-0 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (emphasis added). It
should be noted that the fourth amendment does not require all law enforcement
techniques to be reasonable, but only those techniques which constitute a
1986]
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"translation of the abstract prohibition against 'unreason-
able searches and seizures into workable guidelines for
... particular cases is a difficult task [for the Court]. 31
The second clause of the fourth amendment dictates
the requirements for obtaining a valid search warrant.3 2
The Supreme Court has struggled with the relationship of
the warrant clause to the first clause in the fourth amend-
ment, which requires that searches be reasonable.33 The
issuance of a warrant through the detached scrutiny of a
neutral magistrate undoubtedly provides the best protec-
tion against an unreasonable search. 4 Hence, searches
conducted without a warrant "are [in most cases] per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 31 5  The
Supreme Court has never held, however, that a search al-
"search" or "seizure." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 356 (1974). Additionally, the fourth amendment acts only as a limita-
tion on governmental authorities. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 456, 475
(1921). It does not apply to searches or seizures conducted by private persons.
See generally 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 13 (1973).
31 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched .... For an excellent overview of the history surrounding
search warrants, see Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 457-60; see also
HALL, supra note 18, at §§ 6:1-7; T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 24-38 (1969).
33 HALL, supra note 18, at § 1:3. According to one scholar, three possible inter-
pretations exist with regard to whether the two clauses must be read together or
separately:
(1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant re-
quirements specified in the second clause; (2) that the first clause
provides an additional restriction by implying that some searches
may be "unreasonable" . . . even when made under warrant; or (3)
that the first clause provides an additional search power, [making
some searches] "reasonable" even when carried out without a
warrant.
LANDYNSKI, supra note 18, at 42-43 (emphasis in original). The third profferred
interpretation above enjoys the favor of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (upholding the constitutional valid-
ity of a warrantless search performed incident to a lawful arrest). See generally
HALL, supra note 18, at § 1:3.
This comment focuses on the standards for determining the reasonableness of
an aerial search in the absence of a warrant.
'3 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395; Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33.
s Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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ways must be based on a warrant to comply with the
fourth amendment.3 6 Instead, the Court recognizes the
existence of "a few specifically established and well-delin-
eated exceptions" to the warrant requirement.3 7 Such
warrantless searches generally fall within the boundaries
of the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement,
however, only if the official involved has some "probable
cause" or a valid suspicion which justifies the search.3 8
The quantum of suspicion needed to validate a warrant-
less search will vary, of course, with the type and extent of
the particular intrusion.3 9  The seriousness of the intru-
sion, and therefore the reasonableness of the search, de-
pend upon the existence of a "reasonable expectation of
privacy ' 40  surrounding the place, person, or thing
searched.41
The Supreme Court established the "reasonable expec-
tation" test in Katz v. United States.42 Prior to Katz, the
36 HALL, supra note 18, at § 1:4.
37 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. These exceptions include, inter alia, routine entry
searches along the nation's border, United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619
(1977); searches conducted incident to a valid arrest, Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235;
and frisks for weapons when an officer detains a person and the officer has a rea-
sonable suspicion that the individual has committed or is committing a crime,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
38 LAFAVE, supra note 22, at § 3:1, 438-41.
39 Hence, a full-fledged arrest requires a higher level of probable cause than the
articulable suspicion needed for a routine "stop and frisk" procedure. See Terry,
392 U.S. at 21-22. See generally HALL, supra note 18, at §§ 5:5-6.
40 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
4, Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan J., concurring); accord id. at 352-53. See infra
notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
42 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Supreme Court flirted with an "expectation of
privacy" test as early as 1878. See Ex ParteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). In Jackson, a
case dealing with the government's postal and post-road powers, the Court noted
in dictum that "a distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter;
between what is intended to be keptfreeftom inspection, such as ... sealed packages...
and what is open to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and
other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined." Id. at 733 (emphasis
added). The seeds planted in Jackson, however, did not reach fruition until Katz.
HALL, supra note 18, at §§ 2:1-4. Prior to Katz, the Supreme Court relied almost
exclusively on private property law and tort law concepts, especially the doctrine
of trespass. Id. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928)
(finding that the Government's warrantless wiretapping of defendants' telephones
did not constitute a search for fourth amendment purposes, since the wiretapping
involved no physical intrusion of the defendants' premises), overruled, Katz, 389
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Court relied almost exclusively on property law and tort
law concepts to define the parameters of fourth amend-
ment protection.43 Katz rejected rigid adherence to these
concepts as the sole factors in determining the reach of
the fourth amendment.44 In Katz, FBI agents placed mi-
crophones on the top of pay telephone booths to record
the conversations of a Los Angeles bookmaker.45 The
Government subsequently obtained a conviction of the
bookmaker for transmitting wagering information by tele-
phone, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.46 The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, rejecting the Govern-
ment's argument that no search occurred within the
meaning of the fourth amendment since the surveillance
technique used did not physically penetrate the telephone
booth.47 According to the Court, "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places." '48 The Court went on
to state that "the reach [of the fourth amendment] cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure.., the 'trespass' doctrine.., can
no longer be regarded as controlling. '49
Although implicit in its reasoning, 50 the majority opin-
U.S. at 353; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942)(finding no un-
constitutional search when the Government recorded the defendants' conversa-
tion by placing a microphone against a common wall, since the Government
action did not constitute a trespass), overruled, Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
41 See supra note 42.
44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9. See infra notes 42-54 for a complete discussion of
the facts and the Court's reasoning in Katz.
4s Katz, 389 U.S. at 347-48.
46 Id. The Ninth Circuit opinion appears in Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130
(9th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
47 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
4I Id. at 351.
49 Id. at 353. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this position in Oliver, 104
S. Ct. at 1744 n.15: "[T]he common law of trespass furthers a range of interests
that have nothing to do with privacy .... "
Electronic surveillance techniques like those used in Katz present fewer
problems today, thanks to guidelines established by Congress in the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1982). But see
Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461
(1977); Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications of Electronic Tracking Devices, 46
CINN. L. REV. 243 (1977).
30 See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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ion in Katz did not actually use the phrase "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy." That standard arose from Justice
Harlan's oft-quoted concurring opinion and his analysis
of the majority opinion.5 1 Justice Harlan concluded that
the expectation of privacy, and therefore the reasonable-
ness of the search in question, involves a two-part test.52
First, the defendant must have exhibited a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy. Second, the manifested expectation
must be objectively reasonable by societal standards.53
The fourth amendment problems in aerial surveillance
cases stem largely from confusion over the kinds of fac-
tors that should be considered under this "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" test.54
B. Varying Levels of Privacy
Despite Katz's rejection of a fourth amendment analysis
based totally on property law principles, and despite the
Court's assertion that the fourth amendment "protects
people, not places,"' 55 the level of protection against un-
reasonable searches still varies with the "place" being
searched.56 The following discussion focuses on two cate-
gories of cases which illustrate this point. The first cate-
gory, automobile cases, involve fourth amendment
doctrines which touch at least tangentially on aerial sur-
5, Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("My understanding of the rule
... is that there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "). Justice Harlan did not
use the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" either, but his concurrence
generally is recognized as the source of the "reasonable expectation" test. HALL,
supra note 18, at § 2:4. The Supreme Court first applied the "reasonable expecta-
tion" label to the test in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
52 See supra note 51.
5 Id.
See Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 482-89, and Note, Overlooking
the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at 286-90. See also J. HALL, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3:35 (Supp. 1985) (noting that the privacy expectation analysis in most
aerial search cases to date has been "simplistic"). The cases discussed infra notes
137-222 also illustrate the confusion in trying to apply the "reasonable expecta-
tion" test to airborne search situations.
-Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
-6 See infra notes 107-130 and accompanying text.
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veillance. 57 The second category centers on the "open
fields" doctrine which, stated briefly, provides that so-
called "open fields" 58 do not enjoy fourth amendment
protection. 59 This latter doctrine has the potential for di-
rect application in many aerial surveillance situations.6 °
1. Automobiles
The Supreme Court has held that a lesser expectation
of privacy exists for a person in an automobile than for
persons in some other locations such as houses. 6 This
lesser expectation results from the fact that the exterior of
an automobile, as well as many areas inside the vehicle,
generally remain subject to the open view of passersby.6 2
Additionally, most automobile owners leave their vehicles
parked unattended at times, thus exhibiting diminished
expectations of privacy with respect to the contents of the
automobiles.6" Many aerial searches involve flights above
open areas of land visible to anyone passing overhead. 64
The reduced expectation of privacy principle applied to
automobile cases clearly should apply to such
overflights.65
57 See infra notes 61-82 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of how
the fourth amendment standards in automobile cases might apply to airborne
search cases.
58 For fourth amendment purposes, an "open field" may include, in addition to
pasture or range land, a wooded area, an open beach, desert, or even vacant ur-
ban lots. LAFAVE, supra note 22, at § 2.4, 332. The gist of the concept is that an
"open field" includes any area not immediately surrounding a dwelling. Id.
59 See infra notes 83-130 for a complete discussion of the "open fields" doctrine.
- See, e.g., People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 894, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187,
192 (1980) (marijuana cultivation in "plain view"); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii
412, 421, 570 P.2d 1323, 1329 (1977) (patch of marijuana "open to view").
6, Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-92 (1974); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979).
62 HALL, supra note 18, at § 9:8.
6 Id. Automobile owners sometimes do take steps, of course, to safeguard the
contents of the vehicle from inspection (e.g., installing tinted windows).
- See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (aerial search
over 200 acres of secluded Oregon coastal property), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833
(1981); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980)
(airborne search of an open area on a mountain slope).
65 In fact, many courts have found no reasonable expectation of privacy whatso-
ever in such cases, given the open nature of the area surveyed. See, e.g., Dean v.
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In addition to the decreased privacy expectation in au-
tomobile cases, the highly mobile nature of a vehicle may
reduce the fourth amendment protection extended to its
occupant.66  The Supreme Court has recognized that a
warrantless search may be justified when an officer has
probable cause but no practical means to prevent the au-
tomobile's escape while he obtains a warrant.67 In a simi-
lar vein, aerial surveillance may be the only practical
method of enforcing the law in some situations.6 Cer-
tainly this factor should be considered in assessing the le-
gality of an airborne search.69
Before leaving the discussion of automobile cases, it
should be noted that individuals do not lose all fourth
amendment protection by "[stepping] from the sidewalks
into their automobiles. 7 ° In Delaware v. Prouse,7 t for in-
stance, a county patrolman made a random stop of an au-
tomobile for the sole purpose of checking the occupant's
driving license and vehicle registration. 72 The officer sub-
sequently discovered marijuana on the car floor and ar-
Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973) (validat-
ing the warrantless aerial search of a marijuana field because the field was in an
open area); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 419-20, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977)
(upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless flight over a marijuana patch in
an open field, because the owner could not reasonably expect privacy from such
observation). These decisions generally reflect an application of the "open fields"
doctrine, discussed infra notes 83-130 and accompanying text.
- Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 161 (1925) (upholding the war-
rantless search of a vehicle upon probable cause, since it would not be "practica-
ble to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved").
67 Id.
In Allen, 633 F.2d at 1289, for example, the Coast Guard's aerial search over
the defendants' property enabled authorities to uncover drug-smuggling opera-
tions by identifying objects which could not have been seen from land or sea.
69 The author does not mean to suggest that the mere absence of alternative
law enforcement techniques alone justifies an aerial search. The lack of alterna-
tives should not be discounted, however, given the Supreme Court's recognition
of this factor in certain types of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (upholding the warrantless stop of an automobile along
the border made without probable cause, given "the importance of the govern-
mental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of
practical alternatives for policing the border") (emphasis added).
70 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
7 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
72 Id. at 650.
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rested the driver.73 The United States Supreme Court
found that the purely random stop violated the fourth
amendment. The officer should not have made the stop
in the absence of "articulable facts" indicating a "reason-
able suspicion" of criminal activity.75
Two aspects of the Prouse decision are relevant in the
aerial surveillance context. First, the Prouse Court based
its invalidation of random automobile stops in part on the
"substantial anxiety" and "psychological intrusion"
caused by such stops. 76 One has little difficulty imagining
an aerial search which would visit an equally disturbing
psychological intrusion on the person being observed."
A police aircraft buzzing overhead at a low altitude cer-
tainly could create substantial anxiety.
The second important point here stems from the
"wholly capricious 7 8 nature of the stop proscribed in
Prouse. While rejecting the validity of a stop made entirely
at random and at the whim of the field officer, the Court
left open the possibility of less haphazard techniques.79
Likewise, an aerial search should be upheld only when it
encompasses several properties in an entire area, or when
some articulable reason exists for surveillance of a partic-
ular place. 0 One scholar suggests that even general area-
7s Id.
74 Id. at 663.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 657.
77 See, e.g., People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973)
(barring evidence produced by a helicopter search conducted at altitudes as low as
twenty to twenty-five feet above the defendant's backyard). See also infra notes
196-198 and accompanying text.
78 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 651.
79 Id. at 663 ("This holding does not preclude.., methods for spot checks that
involve less intrusion or [methods that do not involve] unconstrained exercise of
discretion.").
- See Allen, 633 F.2d at 1290 ("If there is some reason for concentrating [an
aerial surveillance] on a particular place, as opposed to random investigation to
discover criminal activity, that factor.., contributes to justification for the surveil-
lance.") (emphasis added). In some reported cases, the police have conducted the
aerial search pursuant to some "tip" or other basis of suspicion. See, e.g., People v.
Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981) (police surveyed defend-
ant's property by air to confirm rumors that marijuana was being cultivated). In
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wide aerial surveillances should be considered an
intrusion on fourth amendment rights:
Technological advances in police capabilities should not
be allowed to circumvent the fourth amendment's pro-
scription of general searches merely because those
searches can now be performed unobtrusively .... Gen-
eral searches are as reprehensible as specific searches: it
should not be viewed as less offensive to spy on society
generally than to spy on society individually.8 '
This argument overlooks the fact that aerial surveillance
constitutes the only viable method for policing certain
criminal activities in some areas.8 2
2. "Open Fields"
The pre-Katz property law analysis in fourth amend-
ment cases generated recognition of three distinct catego-
ries of real property8 3 to be protected.8 4 The Supreme
Court afforded the highest level of protection to dwell-
ings, including houses" as well as other types 86 of resi-
dential premises.87 The courts extended similar fourth
other cases, police have discovered illegal activities while on routine aerial patrols.
See, e.g., State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (law enforcement
officials discovered defendant's marijuana patch while on a routine, general area
surveillance).
81 Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 480.
82 Marijuana-raising activities in mountainous or wooded regions provide per-
haps the most obvious example. From this standpoint, drug enforcement authori-
ties share the same lack of alternatives that Border Patrol authorities face. See
supra note 69.
83 "Real property" is used here in its legal sense and refers to "[l]and, and
generally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land." Black's Law
Dictionary 1096 (5th ed. 1979).
84 See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
8- The fourth amendment expressly protects "houses." See supra note 9.
86 See, e.g., Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (extending fourth amend-
ment protection to an apartment); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)
(holding that a hotel or motel room may enjoy as much protection as a house
under the fourth amendment); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948)
(extending the constitutional protection of houses to a room in a boarding
house).
87 E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (finding police
insertion of a microphone into a crevice in the wall of defendant's home unconsti-
tutional and stating that "[a]t the very core [of the fourth amendment] stands the
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amendment protection to the second category, the curti-
lage,88 which includes the buildings and structures in
"close proximity" to the dwelling.8 9 This curtilage cate-
gorization often proved difficult for the courts, given dif-
fering fact situations and differing judicial attitudes about
what structures should fall within the scope of the curti-
lage.90 The final category of property in the traditional
fourth amendment analysis included the land and build-
ings outside the perimeter of the dwelling and curtilage.
Dubbed "open fields" by the Supreme Court,9' such areas
received no fourth amendment protection.92 Despite re-
placement of the property law analysis in fourth amend-
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion").
8 BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 300 (3d ed. 1969) defines "curtilage" as,
"such space as is necessary and convenient, and is habitually used, for family pur-
poses, and the carrying on of domestic employment, including a yard, a garden,
or even a nearby field used in connection with the dwelling." The curtilage con-
cept grew out of medieval notions about the sanctity of areas outside a castle's
main dwelling, but inside the castle walls.J. & F. GIES, LIFE IN A MEDIEVAL CASTLE,
26, 27 (1974). As one authority notes, "[l]t is bizarre that the curious concept of
curtilage, originally taken to refer to the land and buildings within the baron's
stone walls, should ever have been deemed to be of controlling significance as to
the constitutional limits upon the powers of the police." LAFAVE, supra note 22, at§ 2.3, 314. Nevertheless, courts have latched onto the concept in fourth amend-
ment cases. See infra note 89.
89 LAFAVE, supra note 22, at § 2.3, 313-14. See, e.g., United States v. Molkenbur,
430 F.2d 563 (8th Cir.) (concluding that fourth amendment protection includes
the curtilage), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970); Fullbright v. United States, 392
F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding that the fourth amendment protection for
"houses" extends to the curtilage).
- LAFAVE, supra note 22, at § 2.3, 314-15. Compare, e.g., Carney v. United States,
163 F.2d 784 (9th Cir.) (garage falls outside the scope of the curtilage and its
fourth amendment protection), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 824 (1947), with McGee v.
State, 133 Ga. App. 184, 210 S.E.2d 355 (1974) (outlying farm buildings were
protected by the fourth amendment because of their close proximity to the main
dwelling). Today, the fourth amendment's protection of a structure or area prob-
ably depends more on the expectations of privacy surrounding it than on an appli-
cation of the curtilage concept. HALL, supra note 18, at § 3:23; LAFAVE, supra note
22, at § 2.3, 315. See, e.g., State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421 (1980)
(concluding that the protection of the curtilage today depends upon a Katz "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" analysis).
"I The Supreme Court first recognized the "open fields" doctrine in Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (the protection of the fourth amendment "is
not extended to the open fields"). For a complete discussion of Hester and the
"open fields" doctrine, see infra notes 95-130 and accompanying text.
92 See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
ment cases by the Katz "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test, categorization of the place to be searched
still influences the Court.93 The "open fields" doctrine,
recently reaffirmed by the Court,9 4 illustrates this point.
The Supreme Court first applied the "open fields" doc-
trine in Hester v. United States,95 a '1924 decision. In Hester,
the defendant became alarmed when he realized that fed-
eral revenue agents were watching him sell bootleg liquor
to a customer.96 He took two jugs of the liquor and threw
them into a nearby field owned by his father.97 The
agents conducted a warrantless search of the field to find
the jugs. 98 The Supreme Court upheld the search, stating
that "the special protection accorded [by the fourth
amendment] to the people in their 'persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields." 99
Formulation of the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test in Katz led to confusion and uncertainty about the
post-Katz vitality of the "open fields" doctrine, 100 since
Katz stated that " 'the premise that property interests con-
trol the right of the Government to search and seize has
been discredited.' "101 The Katz Court also concluded
that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. "102 Courts struggling with the "open fields" doc-
trine in the aerial surveillance context did not escape the
apparent inconsistency between Hester and Katz.103 Some
93 Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1744 (reaffirming the Katz "reasonable expectation" anal-
ysis, but noting that "[t]he common law may guide consideration of what areas are
protected by the Fourth Amendment"). Oliver, which expressly approved the con-
tinuing viability of the "open fields" doctrine, id. at 1742, is discussed more fully
at infra notes 107-130 and accompanying text.
94 Id.





'o LAFAVE, supra note 22, at § 2.4, 333-38; HALL, supra 18, at § 3:19.
lo, Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967)).
102 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
os Compare, e.g., People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1973) (finding a helicopter search over defendant's property unreasonable after
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courts concluded that the Katz opinion did not preclude
application of the "open fields" doctrine to validate an
airborne search; others opined that Katz implicitly over-
ruled Hester.'°4 One observer, after noting this confusion,
asserted that the better approach would not invoke the
"open fields" doctrine in robotic fashion to justify an ae-
rial search. 05 According to this individual, "[R]eliance on
the open fields doctrine is too limiting to the spirit and
letter of Katz."" 6
Whatever merit this argument had initially, it might be
defeated today given the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Oliver v. United States.10 7 Oliver involved two consoli-
dated "open fields" cases.' 08 In one case, United States v.
Oliver,'0 9 Kentucky State Police conducted a warrantless,
on-foot search of the defendant's field, and found a mari-
juana patch over a mile from the defendant's house."t 0
The trial court suppressed evidence obtained from the
search, concluding that the defendant had exhibited a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy as to the field by putting
up a "No Trespassing" sign and by shouting at the of-
ficers as they entered the property."' The Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court on the ground that no reason-
able expectation of privacy exists for an open field." l2
concluding that Katz overruled the "open fields" doctrine), with Reece v. State,
152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979) (applying the "open fields" doctrine to
validate an aerial search over defendant's field, without any mention whatsoever
of the Katz expectation analysis).
- Comment, Aerial Surveillance: A Plane View of the Fourth Amendment, 18 GONZ. L.
REV. 314-15 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Plane View]. See supra note
103.
105 See Comment, A Plane View, supra note 104, at 315-19.
-o0 Id. at 315. This argument does have a simplistic appeal. As the writer notes,
Katz expressly condemned "reliance on a talismanic solution." Id. Rigid adher-
ence to the "open fields" rule would seem to violate the Katz admonishment
against "talismanic" solutions. But see Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 (concluding that
the "open fields" doctrine is consistent with the "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test).
-7 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
os Id. at 1738-39.
,o 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
11o Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1738.
I Id.
112 Id. at 1739.
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In the second case, State v. Thornton,'1 3 two police of-
ficers acting without a warrant entered a wooded area be-
hind the defendant's house.'1 4  After discovering two
marijuana patches, the officers obtained a warrant and
seized the contraband." 5 The Maine Supreme Judicial
Court affirmed the trial court's position that the initial
warrantless entry violated the defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights."l 6 The Maine court reached this conclusion
because the defendant had posted signs on the property
and had taken other steps which evinced a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. 17
The Oliver majority reaffirmed the "open fields" doc-
trine, finding it applicable in both cases." 8 The Court re-
jected the argument that the "open fields" doctrine
conflicts with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
in Katz. 1 9 The Court noted that the Katz test requires
that subjective expectations of privacy be reasonable by
objective societal standards in order to enjoy fourth
amendment protection. 120  The Court reasoned that
"open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to
shelter. .. . There is no societal interest in protecting
the privacy of those activities . . . that occur in open
fields."' 12' The Court deemed it inconsequential that the
defendants had taken steps to keep others out of the fields
,1- 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).




118 Id. at 1744.
19 Id. at 1740-42.
120 Id. at 1740.
121 Id. at 1741. The dissent argued strongly that reliance on the "open fields"
doctrine as the determinative factor is inconsistent with Katz and its progeny. Id.
at 1746 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent urged that some reasonable expec-
tation of privacy existed in these cases because (1) the defendant landowners en-
joyed both civil and criminal law protection of their right to exclusive possession
of the fields, (2) society does acknowledge use of such fields in a variety of ways
that deserve privacy (e.g., taking solitary walks on the property), and (3) the de-
fendants exhibited subjective expectations of privacy by erecting fences and no
trespassing signs. Id. at 1747-49. According to Professor LaFave, the Oliver dis-
2731986]
274 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
in question by erecting fences and posting no trespassing
signs. 22 Such measures do not give rise to expectations
of privacy in open fields that "society recognizes as rea-
sonable." ' 2' The Court's position on this issue undoubt-
edly will impact on aerial search cases. No trespassing
signs and other precautions to exclude the public typically
have not convinced courts that a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists from overflight surveillance of open
fields. 24 Some commentators have criticized aerial search
decisions reaching this conclusion, on the ground that it
contravenes the guidelines in Katz.' 2 5 The explicit lan-
guage in Oliver 26 may silence some of this criticism.12 7
Finally, although Oliver did not involve an aerial search,
the Court mentioned such searches in dictum.' 28 In de-
termining that no reasonable expectations of privacy exist
for open fields, the Court noted that "both [defendants]
concede that the public and police lawfully may survey
lands from the air."' 129 This statement appears to give at
least implicit approval to application of the "open fields"
sent adheres more closely to the Katz rationale than the majority does. LAFAVE,
supra note 22, at § 2.4, 136 (Supp. 1986).
122 Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741 ("It is not generally true that fences or no trespass-
ing signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields ....
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1980) (upholding the warrantless overflight of defendant's field and rejecting the
notion that measures taken to safeguard the field against ground-level intrusion
created a reasonable expectation of privacy); Burkholder v. Superior Court 96
Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979) (validating an airborne search over
defendant's marijuana patch, and finding that no trespassing signs and a locked
gate created no reasonable expectation of privacy).
125 See Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at 282-83; Gran-
berg, Is Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Constitutional?, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 451, 453-54
(1980). But see Comment, A Plane View, supra note 104, at 325; Kaye, Aerial Surveil-
lance: Private v. Public Expectations, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 258, 258-60 (1981).
126 See supra note 122.
127 But see United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777, 787 (E.D. Cal. 1985)
(concluding that Oliver should not be read to validate per se an aerial search of
defendant's enclosed greenhouse simply because of its location in an open field).
Broadhurst is discussed more fully at infra notes 205-222 and accompanying text.




doctrine in aerial surveillance cases.13 0
II. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE CASES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
A California state court handed down the first reported
aerial search case in 1973. l1 l Since that time, the "case
law [has been] proliferating at a great rate. "132 Most of
these decisions continue to emanate from the state courts.
By and large, the aerial observations in these cases have
been upheld following a finding that the defendant in
question enjoyed no reasonable expectation of privacy
from the search.13 3 Unfortunately, the various approaches
taken by state courts to reach this result prove too numer-
ous for detailed analysis in this comment.1 3 4 Many of the
]so See National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen,
608 F. Supp. 945, 957 (N.D. Cal. 1985). While applicable to open fields, however,
the Oliver Court's statement should not be interpreted as justifying warrantless
aerial searches of a dwelling or curtilage. Id. See LAFAVE, supra note 22, at § 2.3,
134 n.170.2 (Supp. 1986). In addition, it may not apply to aerial surveillance of a
structure located in an open field but outside the curtilage. See Broadhurst, 612 F.
Supp. at 787.
1-, People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973). In Sneed,
the court invalidated a helicopter search conducted at altitudes of twenty to
twenty-five feet above the defendant's corral, but noted that the defendant would
not have had a "reasonable expectation of privacy from.., airplanes and helicop-
ters flying at legal and reasonable heights." Id. at 542-43, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
For excellent discussions of Sneed and the California aerial search decisions which
followed, see Granberg, supra note 125, at 451-54, and Kaye, supra note 125, at
258-60.
132 HALL, supra note 18, at § 3:35 (Supp. 1985).
13 Id.
-s' See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Some of the more recent state
court decisions addressing the aerial search issue include Izzard v. State, 663
S.W.2d 192 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding the validity of a helicopter flight over
defendant's marijuana field because no reasonable expectation of privacy existed
under the "open fields" doctrine); People v. Mayoff, 150 Cal. App. 3d 7, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 450 (1983) (finding the warrantless aerial search over defendant's marijuana
field lawful because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy given the
remote location of the property and the frequency of other flights in the area);
People v. Egan, 141 Cal. App. 3d 798, 190 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1983)(concluding that
no reasonable expectation of privacy existed to render the aerial surveillance of
defendant's marijuana cultivation unconstitutional); Murphy v. State, 413 So. 2d
1268 (Fla. App. 1982) (applying the "open fields" doctrine to uphold the validity
of a helicopter search 150 feet above defendant's cannabas patch located 300 to
450 feet from defendant's dwelling); State v. Ryder, 315 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1982)
(finding no fourth amendment violation when sheriffs conducted a warrantless
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factors relied on by these courts, however, also have been
considered in the handful of federal court opinions ad-
dressing the aerial search issue.' 3 5 The following discus-
sion focuses on the these federal cases. Because of Oliver's
potential ramifications in the aerial surveillance con-
text, 3 6 the cases below are analyzed chronologically as
pre-Oliver decisions or post-Oliver decisions.
A. The Pre-Oliver Cases
In United States v. DeBacker,137 a federal district court
confronted an issue previously addressed only by state
courts: the constitutionality of an aerial search. The de-
fendant in DeBacker challenged the validity of warrantless
airborne observations conducted over his farm, located in
aerial search of defendant's farm to locate stolen equipment, because the defend-
ant enjoyed no reasonable expectation of privacy from the overflight); State v.
Bigler, 100 N.M. 515, 673 P.2d 140 (N.M. App. 1983)(validating warrantless ae-
rial observations of defendant's marijuana cultivation because the defendant en-
joyed no reasonable expectation of privacy from overflights given the close
proximity of his property to a municipal airport); People v. Abbott, 94 A.D.2d
831, 463 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1983) (reversing the trial court's denial without a hearing,
of a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a helicopter flight over a field
adjacent to defendant's residence; the fourth amendment issue required analysis
of factual issues never addressed, such as the manner of the aerial search); State
v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1982) (upholding the legality of warrantless
helicopter flights over defendant's marijuana field because no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy existed for the open field in question); Goehring v. State, 627
S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (applying the "open fields" doctrine to vali-
date a warrantless overflight of defendant's marijuana crop).
For a closer examination of the earlier state court decisions, see Comment, Ae-
rial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 474-89, and Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 14, at 276-89. The California cases, which constitute a large portion of
the case law in the aerial search context, are discussed in Granberg, supra note
125, at 451-54, and Kaye, supra note 125, at 258-60.
,-. The federal court decisions turning on the aerial surveillance question in-
clude Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985) (No. 84-1259); United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F.
Supp. 777 (E.D. Cal. 1985); National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Bass-
ford, 601 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Me. 1985); United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Ky. 1980); and United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D.
Mich. 1980). For a complete discussion of these cases, see infra notes 131-222
and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 105-130 and accompanying text.
137 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
the "boondocks" of Michigan.'3 8 The search, conducted
at lawful altitudes, 39 revealed a marijuana crop located in
fields some distance from the defendant's house. 140 The
defendant had placed a fence around the property, and
had posted signs forbidding trespassing. 14  To further
conceal the illegal crop, he had surrounded it with barley,
corn, and alfalfa. 142
The DeBacker court rejected the argument that the steps
taken by the defendant to keep the public out created a
reasonable expectation of privacy from the aerial search
in question. 143 The court refused, however, to apply the
"open fields" doctrine in mechanical fashion. 144 After re-
flecting on the Supreme Court's position in Katz that
fourth amendment protection depends upon the person
and not the place, 45 the district court reasoned that the
fourth amendment requires analysis of the type of surveil-
lance and not just the area searched.1 46 The court denied
the defendant's motion to suppress, however, stating that-
isolated instances of aerial surveillance over "open fields"
[as in this case] do not offend the Constitution. "Open
fields" are not areas in which one traditionally can reason-
ably expect privacy. This is especially true in a case such
as this where airplane flights over local farm lands and at
138 Id. at 1079.




'4 Id. at 1081 ("[Dlefendant's relatively minor expectations of privacy do not
outweigh the value to society in permitting such non-intrusive surveillance.").
144 Id. The court stated,
The ultimate question, therefore, is not whether the surveillance in
this case occurred in "open fields." Instead, the issue is whether "if
the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permit-
ted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of pri-
vacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society."
Id. (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349
(1974)). But see Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
145 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
146 DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1081.
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low altitudes ... are not infrequent ... 147
The slippery aerial surveillance question raised its head
again in United States v. Mullinex.148 In Mullinex, a defend-
ant arrested for growing and possessing marijuana moved
to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless police
overflight of the open field behind his house.' 49 The Mul-
linex court adopted the DeBacker approach to the "open
fields" argument offered by the Government: "[Under
Katz, the] final analysis is that 'open fields' are not per se
outside the protective boundary of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but a defendant's expectation of privacy in an open
field must be an expectation that society would consider
as reasonable."'15 0 In the case at hand, the defendant did
not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy from the fly-
over in question because airplanes frequently passed over
the defendant's farm.' 5 1 The officers, who conducted the
surveil pursuant to an informant's tip, merely viewed what
"was also exposed to the public."' 152 The remote location
of the farm and the existence of several no trespassing
signs on the property did not render reasonable any sub-
jective privacy expectations defendant might have had. 153
In United States v. Allen, 154 the only pre-Oliver aerial sur-
veillance case decided by a federal court of appeals, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of a warrantless Coast
Guard helicopter flight over the defendants' oceanside
ranch. 5 5 Aerial photographs 156 taken from the helicopter
147 Id.
14 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 514 (emphasis in original).
15, Id. The defendant's girlfriend testified that other planes, including large B-
52 bombers, frequently flew straight over the farm. Id. at 513.
1'- Id. at 514. Evidence at trial, however, suggested that the officers flew the
plane as low as twenty-five to thirty feet above the defendant's field. Id. at 513.
The frequency of other flights, upon which the court relied so heavily, almost
certainly did not involve buzzing the farm at such low altitudes. The court did not
address this point, but it seems to cast doubt on the assertion that "what was
exposed to police aerial surveillance was also exposed to the public." Id. at 514.
1- Id. at 514.
1 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
- Id. at 1290.
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revealed various objects around the defendants' barn
which partially confirmed Government suspicion that the
defendants were using the ranch as a drug-smuggling
base. 15 7 According to the court, the defendants could not
have had even a subjective expectation of privacy from the
"airborne telegraphic scrutiny" of the Coast Guard in this
case.'55 Given the seacoast location of the ranch and the
frequency of Coast Guard flights in the area, the defend-
ants should have expected that their operations might be
discovered by an aerial search.' 59 Furthermore, the flight
did not constitute a "random investigation to discover
criminal activity."'' 60 Instead, the authorities involved had
a prior suspicion which justified concentration of the ae-
rial search in a particular locale.' 6'
B. The Post-Oliver Cases
In United States v. Marbury, 1 62 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first federal court
156 The introduction of aerial photographs as evidence falls under the same
general principles applicable to all photographs. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 796
(1964). Accordingly, such photos must be accurate, relevant and material to some
issue in the case, and must be made a part of some qualified person's testimony.
Id.
157 Allen, 633 F.2d at 1286.
-8 Id. at 1290.
159 Id. This reasoning has been criticized by some observers who assert that it
would allow police to convert any activity into a "reasonable" activity simply by
performing that activity frequently and routinely. See Comment, Aerial Surveil-
lance, supra note 6, at 481; Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at
279. Such criticism presumptiously puts the cart before the horse and, in this
author's opinion, misinterprets the "frequency" argument in cases like Allen. The
mere unilateral decisions of law enforcement authorities never make an activity
"reasonable." Once such a decision is made, however, society recognizes it as
reasonable or unreasonable. For example, society may condone a Coast Guard
decision to conduct routine coastal patrols by air. Once society gives approval to
such flights, a defendant should not be able to ignore their frequency and assert
expectations of privacy from the flights. The frequency factor, therefore, depends
upon a pre-established reasonableness which society recognizes for the activity in
question.
- Allen, 633 F.2d at 1290.
11 Id. This reasoning accords with the analogous Prouse proscription of purely
random automobile stops without some articulable suspicion. See supra notes 78-
82 and accompanying text.
162 732 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1984).
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to directly address the aerial search issue following the 01-
iver reaffirmance of the "open fields" doctrine. In Mar-
bury, police obtained a warrant to search for stolen
equipment on a large gravel pit tract leased by one of the
defendants. 63 After a futile ground-level search, the of-
ficers flew over the gravel dunes in a helicopter and spot-
ted the stolen equipment.'6 Police obtained a second
warrant following the overflight.
65
The Marbury court concluded that the helicopter sur-
veillance did not constitute an unreasonable search. The
court rejected the argument that the first search warrant
was based upon insufficient probable cause. 166 Even in
the absence of a warrant, however, the helicopter search
in this case did not violate the fourth amendment:
[T]he "open fields" doctrine, as reaffirmed [by] Oliver...
would appear to be fully applicable to authorize entry
onto and observations of the plainly noncurtilage portions
of this large tract .... Further, even absent the "open
fields" doctrine, aerial surveillance without a warrant of an
area such as this large commercial gravel pit tract does not
amount to an unconstitutional search, at least where, as
here, it is for the purpose of verifying a particularized, jus-
tifiable belief concerning criminal activity associated with
the premises. 167
The court noted the lack of any evidence suggesting that
police had flown the helicopter at unusually low or intru-
sive altitudes.16 8
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,'6 9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the valid-
ity of a warrantless aerial administrative search in light of
3 d. at 393.
'I Id. at 398.
165 Id.
1 Id. at 394-98.
167 Id. at 398. Because the court upheld the validity of the first search warrant,
the court's statements regarding warrantless aerial surveillance might be consid-
ered dicta.
6 Id. at 398-99 n.11.
log 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985) (No. 84-
1259).
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the Supreme Court's reaffirmance of the "open fields"
doctrine in Oliver. In Dow, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) engaged a private aerial survey company to
take aerial photographs of Dow's 2,000-acre chemical
plant. 70  EPA directed the survey company to take the
photographs with highly sophisticated camera equipment
and at certain angles, to determine if Dow's smokestack
emissions violated the Clean Air Act.' 7' The district court
entered a judgment granting injunctive relief against fu-
ture EPA flyovers, on the ground that the warrantless' 72
overflights violated Dow's fourth amendment right to pri-
vacy.' 73 The Sixth Circuit reversed. 74
Applying the first part of the two-pronged Katz analy-
sis,' 75 the Dow court concluded that the chemical company
had manifested no actual expectation of privacy from
plant overflights. 76 The court acknowledged the steps
taken by the company to guard against ground-level intru-
sions, 77 but found an absence of similar precautions
against aerial observation. 7 The existence of an airport
170 Id at 309-10.
17 Id. Under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (1982), EPA has "upon
presentation of credentials ... a right of entry to, upon or through any premises
of [a person covered by the emission control provisions of the Act]." The district
court had concluded that this section did not give EPA authority to conduct aerial
observations, but only "landbased examination[s]." Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1374 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.
1984). The Sixth Circuit, however, concluded that the Act implicitly gave EPA
general investigative authority. Dow, 749 F.2d at 315.
172 Subject to certain exceptions, the fourth amendment requires that agencies
like EPA obtain a warrant before conducting an administrative search of a com-
mercial facility. Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1978). Two
long-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include the alcohol bever-
age industry, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397. U.S. 72, 77 (1970),
and the firearms industry, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
'7' Dow, 749 F.2d at 310.
174 Id. at 315.
'75 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
176 Dow, 749 F.2d at 312-13.
177 Dow had surrounded its plant with a perimeter fence, and had hired security
guards to regulate access to the plant. Id. at 312.
178 Id. The Dow court indicated that Dow should not be expected to "build a
dome over its entire Midland plant," but that the company could have taken steps
to shield certain "critical spaces" between buildings. Id. This type of reasoning is
not immune from criticism. As one scholar has noted, "an actual expectation of
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near the plant buttressed the court's position. 79 Turning
to the objective element of the Katz test, the court decided
that if any actual expectation of privacy did exist it could
not be considered reasonable. 80 "Although the analogy
is not perfect," said the court, "Dow's Midland plant is
much more like 'open fields' than it is a home or
office." 18
In United States v. Bassford,18 2 a federal district court had
occasion to apply Oliver in the more typical "marijuana"
aerial search paradigm. 8 3 The case involved warrantless
airborne observations over the remote and wooded
properties of two separately charged defendants. 84 Both
defendants urged that the flights in question violated
their fourth amendment rights, since authorities con-
ducted the searches over areas within the curtilage of each
property. 8 5 The court refused to invalidate the searches
under this curtilage argument. 186 First, Oliver did not ad-
dress the extent to which the curtilage exception to the
"open fields" doctrine might apply - especially to curti-
lage areas open to aerial observation. 18 7  Second, the
court noted that the curtilage concept typically bars only
physical intrusion of the curtilage, not observation of cur-
tilage areas visible from ground locations outside the curti-
privacy skyward is virtually impossible." Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note
6, at 483. Applying the subjective prong of the Katz test as the Dow court did
arguably requires complete enclosure of an area before privacy expectations from
aerial surveillance can be found. See id.
179 Dow, 749 F.2d at 312.
180 Id. at 313. Although this part of the opinion may appear to be dictum at first
blush, a court always must address the objective considerations of the Katz test,
even if it avoids the subjective inquiry. See Amsterdam, supra note 144, at 381-87.
I' Id. The court went on to acknowledge the broader protection afforded the
curtilage, but rejected the argument that Dow's plant formed an "industrial curti-
lage." Id. at 313-14.
182 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985).
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1326-27.
18' Id. at 1328, 1332. Some of the marijuana discovered on one of the defend-
ant's properties lay at a distance of only 100 feet from the defendant's dwelling.
Id. at 1333.
18 Id. at 1331, 1333.
817 Id. at 1329.
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lage. 18 8 Given this, "there would appear to be no sound
basis for distinguishing between 'curtilage' and 'noncurti-
lage' areas equally visible from the air."18 9 The court up-
held the overflights on the ground that they did not
violate any reasonable expectation of privacy.' 90
In National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) v. Mullen,19' a federal district court in California
adopted a slightly different approach to the curtilage issue
than the approach taken in Bassford. In NORML, two or-
ganizations and ten California residents filed a class action
suit against several state and federal officials and agencies
involved in California's Campaign Against Marijuana
Planting (CAMP). 192  The plaintiffs sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as damages,1 93 for various
,88 Id. at 1331 (citing Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir.
1968), and State v. Peakes, 440 A.2d 350, 352-53 (Me. 1982)).
189 Id. The court's reasoning here may be erroneous for a couple of reasons.
First, there may be instances where property owners take different steps to safe-
guard their curtilage depending upon whether they are guarding it against terres-
trial intrusion or aerial observation. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying
text. Second, the court falls short of logical consistency by implicitly accepting the
position that searches over open fields are reasonable per se, Bassford, 601 F. Supp.
at 1328-29 (discussing Oliver's reaffirmance of the "open fields" doctrine), but in-
sisting that searches over curtilage areas be analyzed on a "case-by-case" basis.
Id. at 1330.
1oo Id. at 1332-33. The court also rejected the argument that use of high-pow-
ered binoculars by one of the officers flying overhead made the observations un-
reasonable. Id. at 1335 ("Although there may well be circumstances in which it
would be appropriate to restrict the use of sophisticated technological devices for
aerial observation of objects otherwise invisible to the naked eye, [the use of binoc-
ulars here merely enhanced] a readily visible marijuana plot .... ). For a more
complete discussion of technologically aided aerial surveillance, see infra notes
284-301 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note
6, at 489-92; Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND.
L. REV. 409, 426-28 (1982).
19, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
192 Id. at 949.
, Id. The plaintiffs sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which
provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any [Constitutional right, privilege, or immunity] shall be lia-
ble ....
Although section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law,
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CAMP activities which the plaintiffs alleged violated their
fourth amendment rights. 194 These activities included, in-
ter alia, the use of helicopters to locate marijuana cultiva-
tions and to transport CAMP troops for raids on
marijuana farms. 9 The plaintiffs offered unrebutted tes-
timony that CAMP personnel, acting without warrants,
landed helicopters in their yards, hovered outside bed-
room windows, and used the properties of some individu-
als as staging areas for helicopter take-offs and
landings. 196 On more than one occasion, the CAMP heli-
copters flew low enough for people in their yards to see
the occupants' faces in detail. 197 The low-level flights fre-
quently scared those on the ground, prompting retreat to
shelter in nearby woods or elsewhere.' 98
The district court granted injunctive relief and upheld
the plaintiffs' right to sue for damages, concluding that
the "aerial antics" in question violated both the fourth
amendment proscription against unreasonable searches
and plaintiffs' right under federal statute to be free from
the dangers of hazardous aviation practices.' 99 Turning
analogous civil liability may be imposed uponfederal agents if they commit serious
violations of federal constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment vio-
lation by FBI agents gives rise to damage action).
- NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 949.
,95 Id. One year prior to this decision on the helicopter activities, the court
denied the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction against CAMP's deploy-
ment of high altitude U-2 spy planes to surveil potential marijuana crop locations.
Id.
]g8 Id. at 955-56. One man testified that a CAMP helicopter hovered over his
outhouse and watched him defecate. Id. at 955. A woman complained that CAMP
officials on one occasion hovered over her as she took a shower in her outdoor
bath. Id. Still another individual reported that a CAMP helicopter tailed her car,
hovering so close overhead that her pet dog inside the car became nervous and
"lost his bowels." Id. at 959.
197 See id. at 955-56.
19, Id. at 958. On one occasion, a CAMP helicopter reportedly chased down
two terrified twelve-year-old girls, who hid under some bushes until the aircraft
left. When they came out of hiding, the helicopter returned to chase them again.
Id. The court suggested that activity such as this may constitute not only an un-
reasonable search, but an unlawful seizure as well. Id.
1- Id. at 959-60, 965-66.
first to the distinction between the curtilage and open
fields, the court stated,
After Oliver there is little question but that CAMP can use
aircraft to locate marijuana gardens in open fields, [but
here the] helicopters are no longer just surveying open
fields, but are deliberately looking into and invading peo-
ples' homes and curtilage. Moreover, this prying is not lim-
ited to an occasional, casual peek ... but is accomplished
through sustained and repeated buzzings, hoverings, and
dive bombings ... 200
The court also took constitutional objection to the ran-
dom nature of the airborne searches, noting that even
when CAMP officials are at lawful vantage points, they
cannot conduct "a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. '"201 Finally, the court relied heavily on the fact
that several of the helicopter flights in question violated
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations estab-
lishing minimum altitude limits20 2 for helicopters. 20 3 The
court characterized such illegal flights as "presumptively
* . . unreasonable. 20 4
A more recent decision from another federal district
court in California presents a rather unique reading of the
"open fields" doctrine after Oliver. In United States v.
Broadhurst,20 5 several defendants moved to suppress evi-
dence obtained from warrantless aerial observations of a
greenhouse located on their rural property. 6 The of-
200 Id. at 957 (emphasis added).
201 Id. at 958 (quoting United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1013 (9th Cir.
1983)). The court limited its objection here to the searches over homes and curti-
lages, stating clearly that "[d]efendants are enjoined from using helicopters for
general surveillance purposes, except over open fields." Id. at 965.
202 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(c) (1985) provides that in noncongested areas, an aircraft
may not be operated lower than "[a]n altitude of 500 feet above the surface ex-
cept over water or sparsely populated areas." In sparsely populated areas, "the
aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or
structure." Id.
203 NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 957-58, 965-66.
204 Id. at 965.
205 612 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
200 Id. at 779.
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ficers who conducted the searches flew complete circles
around the greenhouse at altitudes above 1,000 feet, for
the sole purpose of trying to detect marijuana inside the
structure.20 ' The court rejected the defendants' argu-
ment that the building lay within the curtilage, pointing
out that Oliver arguably restricts residential curtilage pro-
tection to the area "immediately surrounding the
home. '2 0 8 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the sur-
veillance in question violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy.20 9
Despite the open-field location of the greenhouse, the
court concluded that Oliver did not preclude a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the circumstances. 21 0  The
defendants took several steps to conceal the area, includ-
ing installation of fencing and no trespassing signs, and
use of specially tinted siding for the greenhouse.2 1t They
could not reasonably expect a police aircraft to fly in 360
degree circles over the greenhouse in hopes of discover-
ing marijuana inside by observing the structure from just
the correct angle.2 12 Oliver could not be stretched to vali-
date such a search.213 The Broadhurst court first noted that
fourth amendment protection extends to commercial
buildings as well as private homes.21 4 Because farmers in
rural areas frequently utilize greenhouses like this for
business purposes, reasonable expectations of privacy
207 Id. at 781-82.
208 Id. at 788 (quoting Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741). In the defendant's case, the
greenhouse was over 375 feet from the residence. Its only connection to the
house was a footpath over steep, hilly terrain. Id.
2-0 Id. at 794-95.
210 Id. ("[T]he open fields doctrine is not at issue since the officers.., were not
and had no intention of observing the open fields .... but rather sought exclu-
sively to observe the contents of an enclosed structure on the land."). Acknowl-
edging Oliver's statement that the "police may lawfully survey lands from the air,"
Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741 n.9, the Broadhurst court asserted that the careful choice
of the term "lands" indicated that the Supreme Court did not mean to give per se
approval to aerial observations of enclosed structures. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. at
787 n.7.
21, Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. at 785.
212 Id. at 792.
21 See id.
214 Id. at 790 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978)).
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may exist even when the situs of the structure is an open
field. 215 The court then proceeded to apply the Katz rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test. 21 6 The Government
argued that because shadowed outlines of the marijuana
could be detected through the greenhouse roof, the
plants were in plain view2 1 7 and no expectation of privacy
existed.1 The court rejected this argument, observing
that the defendants had taken steps to protect their pri-
vacy in the contents of the greenhouse.21 9  The court
stated that although "an airport was located within a few
miles of the [defendants' property, the defendants could
not] predict that pilots would employ specialized maneu-
vers permitting them to catch brief glimpses of light and
shadow emanating from the otherwise sealed struc-
ture. ' 22 0  The Broadhurst court held that the airborne
searches directed specifically at the contents of the struc-
ture violated the fourth amendment. 22 ' The court limited
215 Id. (Given the level of agricultural activity in the area, the court could "imag-
ine no persuasive rationale for officers to generally presume that protected busi-
ness activities are not taking place within greenhouses, barns, sheds and the
like").
216 Id.
217 Technically, the "plain view" doctrine comes into play only when an officer
already has made a lawful entry or arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 466 (1971). The doctrine often is confused with the concept that ob-
jects in "open view" from a lawful vantage point, without police entry or arrest, are
afforded no fourth amendment protection. Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra
note 6, at 466. The Government's argument in Broadhurst actually amounted to an
"open view" rather than a "plain view" argument. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351
("What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.").
218 Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. at 790.
219 Id. at 793-94.
220 Id. at 792. The court distinguished the Allen court's decision upholding a
Coast Guard helicopter search over a seacoast ranch, and concluded that Allen
might have reached a different result if the search there had involved an enclosed
structure. Id. at 793 n.16. The Broadhurst court based this conclusion on the Allen
statement that
a person need not construct an opaque bubble over his or her land
in order to have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the
activities occurring there in all circumstances [but the present case
does not present] an attempt to reduce ... the privacy expectation
associated with the interiors of residences or other structures.
Id (quoting Allen, 633 F.2d at 1380).
221 Id. at 795.
288 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
its holding to the searches over the greenhouse, sug-
gesting that the "open fields" doctrine arguably justified
an earlier overflight of the land around the structure.222
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS CONSIDERED IN
AERIAL SEARCH CASES
A. Property Distinctions
Clearly, vestiges of common law property distinctions
continue to sway the courts to some extent in the aerial
surveillance context. 2 3 This probably reflects the reality
that references to the "place" of the search sometimes
cannot be avoided in passing on the reasonableness of
privacy expectations. 4 At least one observer argues that
the courts have "relied almost exclusively" on property
characteristics, and that such reliance violates the spirit of
Katz. 2 5 Not only does this assertion exaggerate the de-
pendence on property distinctions,22 6 but the author sub-
mits that property characteristics necessarily play a key
role in an aerial search analysis.
Despite widespread criticism of the "open fields" doc-
trine by aerial surveillance commentators,22 7 the Oliver
opinion leaves little doubt about the continuing vitality of
the doctrine. The author agrees with the Oliver majority
that an "open fields" rule can be applied consistently with
Katz's "reasonable expectations" test.22 8  Neither this
222 Id. at 794 ("Arguably, the first overflight was justified by the suspicion that
marijuana might be growing in the open fields. No such justification existed, how-
ever, for the return flights ... to observe the interior of the structure in a manner
[the officers] could not do by ground level observation.").
223 See, e.g., Dow, 749 F.2d at 312.
224 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Comment, Aerial
Surveillance, supra note 6, at 467 n.58 (citing a laundry list of post-Katz cases relying
on a property-determinative interpretation of the fourth amendment).
225 Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at 277.
226 Courts have, in fact, relied on a wide variety of non-property-related factors
including the altitude of the aircraft, the frequency of overflights in the area, and
the intensity of the search. See Annot., 56 A.L.R. FED. 772, 776-78 (1982).
227 See, e.g., Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 472; Comment, A Plane
View, supra note 104, at 315-16; Comment, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 409, 431 (1982).
228 Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
statement nor the Oliver opinion, however, should be
looked on as a rubber stamp for unwavering application
of the doctrine. There may be situations where a reason-
able expectation of privacy exists even in an open field.
The greenhouse in Broadhurst provides just one exam-
ple. 22 9 The "open fields" doctrine should raise an initial
presumption that flights over an open area do not en-
croach on reasonable expectations of privacy, because
such areas normally remain open to public view. 2 30 The
logic behind the presumption may falter if, for example,
police conduct a purely random aerial observation over a
particular piece of property. 3 ' Similarly, a flight con-
ducted at below lawful altitudes might overstep the
bounds of what society considers reasonable. 3
The fact that some reasonable expectation of privacy
might exist even in an open field cannot depend on purely
subjective manifestations, however.233  Precautionary
measures against visual intrusion will not suffice, standing
alone, to invalidate an airborne search.234 Emphasis must
be placed on the reasonableness society affords those
measures. 23 5 In most instances, society recognizes little
or no expectation of privacy in open fields.23 6 Courts do
not offend the holding in Katz, therefore, by applying the
"open fields" doctrine in the absence of a strong showing
that reasonable privacy expectations exist.23 7 Legal theo-
rists should not lose sight of the practical considerations
the fourth amendment requires in balancing privacy inter-
ests in open fields against society's interest in enforcing
229 See supra notes 210-221 and accompanying text.
230 See Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
231 See infra notes 276-283 and accompanying text.
232 See infra notes 246-253 and accompanying text.
2, Kaye, supra note 125, at 260.
234 Id.
23 Id. Failure to consider the second, objective prong of the "reasonable ex-
pectation" test leads to questionable statements like the following: "If the defend-
ant has shielded his marijuana patch from ground observation, he has
demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy." Granberg, supra note 125, at
454.
236 Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
237 See id.
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its laws. 38
If the "open fields" doctrine raises a presumption that
searches conducted over open fields violate no reasonable
expectation of privacy, then the traditional fourth amend-
ment protection afforded the curtilage 239 should raise an
opposite presumption that aerial searches over curtilage
areas are unreasonable.2 40  Like the "open fields" doc-
trine, however, the curtilage distinction ought not be ap-
plied in purely mechanical fashion.2 4 ' As the Bassford case
illustrates, there may be situations in which airborne sur-
veillance of objects within the confines of the curtilage
does not encroach on any reasonable privacy interest.242
2-8 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text, and supra note 82 and accom-
panying text. In most instances, a farmer probably will have little objection to
someone spying on his soybeans. Typically, protests of open field overflights
come from those who have something illegal to hide (e.g., a marijuana patch).
While fourth amendment protection should not hinge on the legality of what a
search uncovers, the unique practical limitations society faces in attempts to con-
trol unlawful activities conducive to an open fields setting must be balanced
against individual fourth amendment interests. In those rare circumstances when
airborne surveillance might involve more than minimal intrusion on an open
fields activity, ample exceptions to the "open fields" doctrine exist. Oliver, 104 S.
Ct. at 1741-42 n.10.
239 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
240 See NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 957. See also LAFAVE, supra note 22, at § 2.3,
315 ("Some of the post-Katz cases still rely upon the curtilage concept.... This is
not particularly objectionable, for there is no reason to view Katz as having some-
how reduced the protection of in-curtilage structures; surely a justified expecta-
tion of privacy exists as to them."). In People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081,
208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985) (No. 84-1513), a
California court invalidated a warrantless aerial search of defendant's fenced back-
yard. The court rejected the state's argument that the Oliver decision condoned
warrantless surveillance of curtilage areas: "[The Oliver Court] made it clear that
the area within the curtilage - 'the land immediately surrounding and associated
with the home' - was entitled to the 'right of privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment.'" Id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (quoting Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741-42).
The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Ciraolo case,
105 S. Ct. 2672 (1984) (No. 84-1513, argued Dec. 10, 1985), and an opinion may
be handed down by the time this comment appears in print.
24, LAFAvE, supra note 22, at § 2.3, 315.
242 See supra notes 185-189 and accompanying text. The Bassford court reasoned
that since observations of curtilage areas from lawful ground-level vantage points
generally are permissible absent physical intrusion, aerial surveillance of the same
areas from above must be considered reasonable. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. at 1331.
Hence, there exists "no sound basis for distinguishing between 'curtilage' and
'noncurtilage' areas equally visible from the air." Id. While the author agrees
with the underlying premise in the court's reasoning - i.e., that curtilage areas do
Finally, accessibility to the property in question may
contribute little to fourth amendment analysis of an air-
borne search, although several courts have cited accessi-
bility as a factor. 43 The problem with relying on the
accessibility of the property lies in the fact that it cuts both
ways in assessing the reasonableness of a search. In
DeBacker, for instance, the court concluded that the de-
fendant could not reasonably expect to escape occasional
aerial observation, since police had virtually no other way
to reach the remote property in question.24 4 It seems
equally plausible, however, to view a property owner's de-
cision to purchase rural property as further evidence of
privacy expectations. 4 5
B. Altitude of the Overflight
Several courts have placed at least some significance on
altitude regulations in determining the reasonableness vel
non of an aerial search.246 The NORML court adopted
perhaps the best approach by characterizing flights violat-
ing FAA altitude regulations as "presumptively... unrea-
sonable. ' 24 7 The FAA regulations relied on in NORML
offer a simple, uniform, minimum standard which police
overflights should have to meet to be declared reasonable
in any situation:
not fall per se within the protection of the fourth amendment, the curtilage distinc-
tion should not have been brushed aside so swiftly and completely. The use of
satellites, aircraft, and other high-tech aerial surveillance instruments perhaps
makes the court's analogy to ground-level observations less than perfect. See Com-
ment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 490-492; Note, Overlooking the Fourth
Amendment, supra note 14, at 286-90.
245 See, e.g., DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1081; Dean, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 117-18, 110
Cal. Rptr. at 589; Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d at 542-43, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
244 DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1081.
2- See Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1748-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
246 Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 488. See, e.g., Debacker, 493 F.
Supp. at 1081 (upholding the legality of an airborne search conducted at lawful
altitudes); NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 958-59, 965 (finding helicopter overflights
unreasonable, in part because they violated minimum altitude regulations).
247 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Conversely, neither NORML nor
this comment suggest that a search conducted in compliance with FAA regulations
enjoys any inherent reasonableness.
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Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person
may operate an aircraft below the following altitudes:
.. Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement,
or over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of
1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal
radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.
• . .Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet
above the surface except over open water or sparsely
populated areas. In that case, the aircraft may not be op-
erated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle,
or structure .... Helicopters may be operated at less than
[the above minimum altitudes] if the operation is con-
ducted without hazard to persons or property on the
surface.248
The proposed unlawful altitude rule could be applied
even in an "open fields" setting. In most instances, an
open field will lie in an uncongested area for purposes of
the above statute, making overflights subject to the less
rigorous requirement of not flying within 500 feet of a
"person, vessel, vehicle, or structure. ' 249 A flight which
violated this rule would, by definition, almost certainly in-
volve the search of more than just an open field.
Some commentators criticize the idea that FAA mini-
mum altitude violations should render an aerial search
unreasonable per se. 250 These critics find the approach too
mechanical. 251 However, the approach clearly answers the
Oliver call for workable guidelines to aid the courts and
law enforcement authorities in the fourth amendment
context. 52 And while fourth amendment rights should
not rise or fall totally with federal regulations or statutes,
the author submits that the FAA altitude rules probably
248 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1985) (emphasis in original).
249 Id. at § 91.79(c).
250 Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 488; Comment, A Plane View,
supra note 104, at 336-37 (citing State v. Davis, 51 Or. App. 827, 627 P.2d 492
(1981), for the proposition that reliance on FAA regulations smacks of a "talis-
manic and mechanical approach" which would thwart the Katz "reasonable expec-
tation" analysis).
251 See, e.g., Comment, A Plane View, supra note 104, at 336-37.
252 See Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
provide a fairly accurate barometer of what society con-
siders reasonable. 253
C. Frequency of Other Flights
The primary objection to reliance on the frequency of
other flights in the area as a factor in the reasonable ex-
pectation analysis has been summarized by one writer as
follows: "[S]imply by increasing the number of flights, law
enforcement officers would be able to derogate the rea-
sonableness of an individual's expectation [of pri-
vacy]." 12 54  This objection assumes that the frequency
factor could preclude expectations of privacy solely
through unilaterally increased surveillance on the govern-
ment's part.255 This assumption proves too much. 56
Stepped-up law enforcement activities must be reasonable
from the outset before they can diminish privacy expecta-
2517tions. The frequency factor merely suggests that once
the public explicitly or implicitly approves increased aerial
activity in a given area, property owners in that area
should not be heard to argue that they did not expect
flights over their properties. 58 In regions where frequent
overflights would give rise to public outcry, a unilateral
decision by government officials to intensify aerial obser-
vations would not defeat reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy under a frequency argument.2 5 9
D. Fences, No Trespassing Signs, and Other Precautionary
Measures
Airborne search cases almost universally reject the ar-
2- See NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 958-59, 965.
2- Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at 279.
255 Criticism of the frequency factor stems from Professor Amsterdam's hypo-
thetical in which he pictures government extinguishment of privacy expectations
through official, advance announcements that authorities will increase surveil-
lance. See Amsterdam, supra note 144, at 384.
25 See supra notes 257-259 and accompanying text. See also supra note 159.
257 See supra note 159.
258 See id.
259 See supra note 159.
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gument that fences, signs, and other "minor '2 60 attempts
to exclude terrestrial intrusion create reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy from aerial surveillance.2 6' Commenta-
tors criticize this rejection for a couple of reasons. First,
they urge that it constitutes improper circumvention of
the Katz admonition to consider subjective manifestations
of privacy expectations. 6 2 Second, at least one observer
suggests that the approach reflects an attempt to base rea-
sonable expectations on skyward-directed exhibitions of
actual privacy expectations.2 63 This observer finds such
an approach unreasonable because "an actual expectation
of privacy skyward is virtually impossible . . . absent the
complete enclosure of the property. 2 6
4
The first criticism noted above perhaps overemphasizes
the subjective prong of the Katz analysis.265 Precautionary
measures which manifest individual privacy expectations
give rise to fourth amendment protection only when they
create privacy expectations objectively reasonable by soci-
etal norms.266 In this regard, one cannot avoid the plain
import of the language used by Oliver in rejecting the ar-
260 DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1081.
261 See, e.g., Dow, 749 F.2d at 312 (enclosure of property with a perimeter fence;
security guards); Allen, 633 F.2d at 1286 (no trespassing signs and a gate); Mul-
linex, 508 F. Supp. at 514 (no trespassing signs); DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1079
(no trespassing signs and a fence); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d
421, 424, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87-88 (1979)(no trespassing signs and a locked gate);
State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 413, 570 P.2d 1323, 1325 (1977)(locked gate).
262 See Granberg, supra note 125, at 451-54; Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amend-
ment, supra note 14, at 282-83. One writer notes that privacy expectations have
been found in non-aerial search cases after the defendants simply closed a toilet-
stall door, Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1117-18 (E.D. Pa. 1975), locked a
footlocker, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977), or grew grass very
high, State v. Kender, 60 Hawaii 301, 305, 588 P.2d 447, 450 (1978). Note, Over-
looking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at 282-83.
263 Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 483.
264 Id. The Broadhurst case may provide a supportive example for this statement.
In Broadhurst, the court seemed compelled to invalidate airborne observations of
marijuana located in an enclosed greenhouse. See Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. at 794-
95; see supra notes 204-222 and accompanying text. The narrowly worded opinion
in Broadhurst leaves the implication that the overflights might have been upheld
had the marijuana been located outside the structure. See Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp.
at 794.
265 See, Kaye, supra note 125, at 258-60.
2- Id. at 258 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361) (Harlan, J., concurring).
gument that fences, no trespassing signs, and other barri-
ers create reasonable expectations of privacy in open
fields: "The test of legitimacy is not whether the individ-
ual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity.
Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government's
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment. '2 67
The second criticism, attacking reliance on skyward
manifestations of privacy, suggests that a more logical
analysis would examine earthbound exhibitions of privacy
expectations.2 68 This suggestion rests in part on the pre-
sumption that relatively minor manifestations such as
fences and signs create reasonable expectations of privacy
from ground-level intrusion.269 The Oliver opinion leaves
little doubt, however, that such measures standing alone
do not invoke fourth amendment protection even in the
terrestrial search context.270 Furthermore, as Dow points
out, methods do exist by which a property owner could
shield his possessions from aerial observation without
"build[ing] a dome" over the property. 7 '
In summary, the author agrees that a person need not
"construct an opaque bubble ' 272 over his property to en-
joy reasonable expectations of privacy from aerial surveil-
lance. Nonetheless, subjective exhibitions must be
tempered by a standard of objective reasonableness. 73
This may require looking beyond the steps taken, and
considering factors such as the frequency of overflights in
267 Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1743. In a footnote, the Court went on to state that "the
Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment should shelter criminal activ-
ity wherever persons with criminal intent choose to erect barriers and post no
trespassing signs." Id. at n.13. Indeed, there may be times when society cannot
condone a privacy expectation regardless of the efforts employed to hide the ac-
tivity. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-60 (1979).
26 Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 483.
26 See id. at 484.
70 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
27 1 Dow, 749 F.2d at 312. One obvious step a landowner might take to accom-
plish this would be to erect a canopy over the area in question.
272 Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at 282 (quoting Allen,
633 F.2d at 1289).
273 See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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the area.2 74 In any event, the practical reality of Oliver can-
not be ignored; fences and signs alone create no reason-
able expectations of privacy. 75
E. Random Overflights
As suggested above, aerial searches should be invali-
dated when conducted pursuant to arbitrary decisions by
individual officers to fly over a particular piece of property
without some articulable suspicion of illegal activity.2 76
Obviously the need for such a rule would be eliminated if,
as some commentators propose, authorities were forced
to obtain a warrant before conducting an overflight.27 7
Imposing a warrant requirement in all aerial search cases,
however, could substantially hamper the utility of aerial
surveillance as the only practical enforcement technique
available in certain situations. 78 In this regard, aerial
searches may present exigent circumstance concerns
paralleling those found in automobile cases.279
Just as limitations exist on warrantless vehicle stops,
however, 280 boundaries should be established for warrant-
less overflights. The Prouse-like proscription of purely
random airborne searches over particular parcels of land
would provide a much-needed limitation. 28' This ap-
274 See Dow, 749 F.2d at 312-13.
275 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
277 See Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 409, 435-36 (1982); Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at
290.
278 See supra note 69. The author does not quarrel'with the argument that prior
judicial authorization can and should be obtained in a large number of airborne
search cases. See Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance.- A Constitutional Analysis, 35
VAND. L. REV. 409, 435-36 (1982). The author submits, however, that aerial sur-
veillance situations sometimes present the same sort of exigent circumstances
which justify warrantless searches in other contexts, such as the border stops dis-
cussed supra note 69. Further, application of the "open fields" doctrine elimi-
nates the need for a warrant in many cases. See supra notes 237-259 and
accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
280 See the discussion of Prouse in the text at supra notes 70-79.
281 The vast majority of aerial surveillance cases do not address the "random"
factor. Nevertheless, inclusion of this factor in the fourth amendment analysis of
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proach still would allow warrantless aerial searches while
on routine patrol or under some similar general search
carried out pursuant to departmental authorization. 82
Such searches do not pose the "unconstrained exercise of
discretion" problem which concerned the Court in
Prouse. 283
F. The Equipment Used
Aerial surveillance can take three different forms: un-
aided visual searching, equipment-enhanced visual
searching, or photographic searching.2 8 4 The vast major-
ity of cases fall within the first two categories and have
prompted little constitutional objection from the
courts.28 5 The decisions upholding the use of viewing en-
hancement devices generally reflect the reasoning that "if
the policeman is in a place where he has the right to be,
anything he observes is in open view."' 28 6 Criticism leveled
an airborne search does find some support in existing case law. See, e.g., Allen, 633
F.2d at 1290 (upholding the validity of an overflight, in part because it did not
involve "random" investigation to discover criminal activity); NORML, 608 F.
Supp. at 958 (refusing to validate helicopter searches in which officers conducted
"a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incrimi-
nating at last emerges").
282 See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
283 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. While holding unconstitutional the purely random
automobile stop in question, the Prouse Court stated in dicta that "[t]his holding
does not preclude ... methods . . .that involve less intrusion or that do not
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." Id.
2MComment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 488. Some have argued that
an airborne search constitutes a sense-enhanced search by definition. See Note,
Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at 286-90; Granberg, supra note
125, at 453-54. This contention becomes largely academic given the willingness
of courts to uphold vision-enhanced searches when the observing officer occupies
a lawful vantage point. See supra notes 285-286 and accompanying text.
285 See, e.g., People v.Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981)
(police used binoculars, search upheld); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d
886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980) (binoculars, search upheld); State v. Stachler, 58
Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (binoculars, search upheld).
2 8 Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance. A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV.
409, 426 (1982). See the cases cited supra note 285. As a caveat, it should be
noted that some courts upholding optically aided airborne searches have warned
that limits might exist on the degree of sophistication they would be willing to
allow for viewing devices. See, e.g., Stachler, 58 Hawaii at 415, 570 P.2d at 1326;
State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
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at this approach typically rests on the argument that when
visual aids allow authorities to see more than could be
seen with the naked eye, the "open view" rule should not
apply.287 Despite the appealing simplicity of this position,
it has been eschewed in favor of the approach noted
above. 88
One observer offers a standard of analysis which proba-
bly summarizes fairly accurately the approach courts
should take regarding vision-enhanced observations from
the sky: "If all that is observed is what is visible from a
reasonable altitude, or if what is viewed through aided vi-
sion has no privacy expectation attached, then [the over-
flight observation does not violate the fourth
amendment]." 2 8 9 Hence, the validity of the search should
depend upon factors such as the altitude of the flight and
the privacy expectations in the area searched, rather than
the type of equipment used to aid the eye.29°
Aerial photography arguably presents a more difficult
dilemma since satellite surveillance, computer-enhanced
photos, and other high-tech camera capabilities give po-
lice far more than the naked eye could see.291 It comes as
no surprise that aerial surveillance commentators have is-
287 See Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 488-89: "These devices do,
in fact, allow the police to see what they could not otherwise see... such observa-
tions, therefore, should be recognized as violative of the fourth amendment."
288 See supra notes 285-286 and accompanying text.
289 Comment, A Plane View, supra note 104, at 338.
29- Language in a recent Supreme Court case supports this approach: "Nothing
in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and tech-
nology afforded them in this case." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282
(1983). Knotts upheld the warrantless use of an electronic tracking beeper placed
in a container of chemicals, when the beeper revealed no information that could
not have been gleaned from visual surveillance. Id. at 277, 285. An even more
recent Supreme Court decision illustrates the limitations that can be placed on the
sense-enhancement rule enunciated in Knotts, by focusing on factors other than
the equipment used. See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984). Although
Karo involved a beeper similar to the one in Knotts, the Supreme Court invalidated
its use in the privacy of a residence. Id. at 3303. Knotts and Karo support the pro-
posal for a similar shift in aerial surveillance cases to analysis of factors other than
the optical aids used.
'29 See Comment, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 6, at 489-91.
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sued strong warnings about such atmospheric activity. 92
As the Allen court noted, "[g]iven the sophistication of
electronic photographic devices today, there probably are
few unenclosed locations which could not be observed
from some airborne location. 2 9 3
Despite this acknowledgement, the Allen court upheld
the validity of the aerial pictures taken in that case. 294 The
Dow opinion also validated the use of warrantless over-
flight photography. 295 Reconciliation of these decisions
with the concerns just discussed probably reflects a shift
in focus from the equipment used to other factors.296
This shift accords with the approach suggested above for
more conventional optic aids.297
In sum, courts should not lose sight of the fact that
high-tech surveillance may be "the greatest leveler of
human privacy ever known. '2 98  In attempts to place
boundaries on the use of sophisticated aerial search
equipment, however, courts should not trap themselves in
a quagmire filled with hopeless attempts to draw lines
based upon the type of technology used. Focus should be
placed instead on other factors, like the altitude of the air-
craft, property distinctions, and the frequency of other
flights in the area.2 9 9 This de-emphasis on the type of
technology used finds implicit support in some aerial
- See, e.g., id. at 489 (calling high-tech aerial photo enlargements the "most
intrusive form of aerial search"); Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 404, 427 (1982) ("[T]he use of... telescopic
photography . . . increases the potency - and intrusiveness - of the aerial
observation.").
293 Allen, 633 F.2d at 1289.
- Id. at 1290.
295 See supra notes 170-180 and accompanying text.
- Hence, Allen relied in part on the frequency and random factors to justify the
search, see supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text; Dow emphasized the lack
of any reasonable expectation of privacy in the "open fields" area observed, see
supra notes 166-181 and accompanying text.
27 See supra text at notes 289-290.
-8 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (DouglasJ, dissenting).
2o See infra notes 300-301 and accompanying text. This approach takes into
account the possibility that aerial observation with the naked eye or binoculars,
for instance, may be more intrusive in some cases than photos taken from an
orbiting satellite.
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search cases, 30 0 as well as some recent Supreme Court
cases decided outside the aerial surveillance context.0 1
CONCLUSION
When faced with the argument that their proposed con-
stitutional standards for aerial surveillance cases will in-
hibit law enforcement, some expositers fondly respond
with a famous passage once offered by New York's highest
court: "Duties of law enforcement officials are extremely
demanding in a free society. But that is as it should be. A
policeman's job is easy only in a police state. '3 0 2 Because
our society does place extra demands on those who en-
force our laws, the legislative and judicial branches of
government should be quick to establish the parameters
of those demands. Especially in the fourth amendment
area, "workable accommodation[s] [should be estab-
lished] between the needs of law enforcement and the in-
terests protected by the Fourth Amendment. ' 30 3 The
Supreme Court has never formulated such accommoda-
tions for airborne searches, despite employment of air-
craft in police arsenals for what has now been more than
half a century. 4
The case comparison engaged by this comment exem-
plifies the unsatisfactory confusion and inconsistency in-
herent in the various lower court approaches to aerial
surveillance analysis. From an examination of the factors
relied on in these cases, however, an eclectic but practica-
ble set of guidelines emerges for use in future situations.
These guidelines include consideration of property dis-
tinctions in the area searched, 30 5 the altitude of the air-
500 See, e.g., Dow, 749 F.2d at 309-15; Allen, 633 F.2d at 1285-90.
0,, See the discussion of Knotts and Karo, supra note 290.
302 People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 82, 315 N.E.2d 792, 795, 358 N.Y.S.2d
743, 748 (1974). See, e.g., Comment, A Plane View, supra note 104, at 338 (quoting
Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d at 82); Note, Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at
290 (quoting Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d at 82).
sos Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
304 But see supra note 11.
305 See supra notes 223-245 and accompanying text.
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craft, °6 the frequency of other flights in the area, °7 and
the "random" nature of the search.3 0 8 To a lesser extent,
the steps taken by an individual to safeguard his property
from aerial observation also merit consideration.3 0 9 Rela-
tively minor measures to preclude terrestrial intrusion,
however, contribute little to the analysis. 1 0 Similarly, fo-
cus on the type of equipment used probably lends no ana-
lytical assistance that the other factors do not already
provide.3 1 '
Cases like NORML and Broadhurst illustrate that worka-
ble limitations can be placed on aerial law enforcement.
This type of judicial guidance provides reassurance that
we have not yet become an Orwellian society. Complete
confidence in the system, however, will depend upon the
willingness of the United States Supreme Court to fulfill
its constitutional duty3 l 2 in the aerial surveillance context.
As one observer notes, "the legal system must do far bet-
ter than merely postpone the era of 'Big Brother' for a
time beyond 1984."''s3
s,. See supra notes 246-253 and accompanying text.
.,,7 See supra notes 254-259 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 276-283 and accompanying text.
,, See supra notes 260-275 and accompanying text.
I ld.
See supra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
.41 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
,.", Comment, A Plane View, supra note 104, at 339.
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